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This paper contributes to the debate about climate change technology transfer by analysing barriers 
and enablers for a Chilean company starting up the production of wind blades. Literature on the role of 
technology transfer for the development and deployment of local renewable energy technologies in 
developing countries often refers to success stories in Brazil, India and China. Instead, this case study 
highlights the different challenges faced by smaller emerging economies. The paper argues that 
successful technology transfer in a smaller economy like Chile requires: a minimum internal demand 
and access to regional markets to attract foreign knowledge providers; a focus in the types of 
technologies where the recipient country or company have a competitive advantage; and active 
learning processes by the recipient company. Lessons are drawn for improving the design and 
implementation of technology-push and market-pull policies in small or medium emerging economies. 
1. Introduction 
Developing countries are experiencing unprecedented levels of 
growth. As a result they will be responsible for most of the future 
growth in energy demand and Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions 
(International Energy Agency (IEA), 2010a). The largest, fast 
growing countries, such as Brazil, China and India will cover most 
of this growth. 
Curbing GHG emissions in developing countries has therefore 
become one of the cornerstones of a future international climate 
change agreement under the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion for Climate Change (UNFCCC). However, setting caps to 
developing countries' GHG emissions has faced a strong resis-
tance in the current negotiations. Continued economic growth 
that allows poverty eradication is still the main priority of most 
developing countries and caps are perceived as a constraint to 
future growth prospects. The development, transfer and use of 
low carbon technologies have more positive connotations than 
caps to emissions and are more widely accepted among develop-
ing countries as a way to achieve sustained growth without 
compromising the climate. Inadequate empirical evidence exists 
to guide policy making in the area of international low-carbon 
Technology Transfer (TT). This paper provides new evidence for 
policy makers by analysing the TT process in the specific case of 
an emerging low-carbon industry in Chile. 
Since its inception, the UNFCCC has recognised the importance 
of TT to achieve stabilisation of global emissions. In the 13th 
Conference of the Parties (COP-13) in Bali, technology became one 
of the four pillars of an expected post-2012 climate change 
regime. The debate on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) was one 
of the thorniest issues within the TT negotiations up to COP-16 in 
Cancun. It divided developed and developing country positions 
showing their different political discourses on development and 
diffusion (Ockwell et al., 2010). The issue of IPR was finally left 
out of the Cancun Agreements, which decided to establish a 
Technology Mechanism (TM) that contains a Technology Execu-
tive Committee and a Climate Technology Centre and Network. 
The objective of the TM is to enhance clean technology develop-
ment and diffusion. Funding availability for the TM and the 
mechanisms to allocate these funds are still under discussion. 
Also, eligibility criteria for countries and technologies have not 
yet been addressed. 
To date, the UNFCCC has attempted to promote TT through 
several means: an Expert Group on Technology Transfers (EGTT), 
Technology Needs Assessments (TNA), and two financial mechan-
isms: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF). The EGTT will be replaced by the TM, 
as decided in the Cancun Agreements. TNA systematically iden-
tify, evaluate, and prioritise climate change technologies for 
developing countries (United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), 2009). The CDM was created by the Kyoto Protocol to 
reduce the cost of compliance for Annex I countries by taking 
advantage of cheaper emission reduction opportunities in non-
Annex I parties, and to support sustainable development in non-
Annex I host countries. The GEF is the financial mechanism of the 
UNFCCC as well as other UN Conventions. It provides grants to 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition 
for projects related to biodiversity, climate change, international 
waters, land degradation, the ozone layer and persistent organic 
pollutants. Neither the CDM nor the GEF were created with the 
aim to fund TT; however, they have done so indirectly. 
The success of UNFCCC efforts to promote TT has been limited. 
The EGTT has been criticised for delaying difficult but necessary 
decisions to enhance TT and for the lack of expertise of its political 
representatives (South Center (SC) and Center for International 
Environmental Law (CIEL), 2008). TNAs have identified potential 
projects but have failed to implement them. The GEF has only a 
limited budget which has resulted smaller in scale than the market-
based CDM. A recent study shows that 40% of CDM projects 
accounting for 59% of estimated emission reductions (roughly 
335 MtC02/year) claim to involve TT1 (Seres et al. 2010). The CDM 
has contributed to technology diffusion, reducing the payback period 
and improving the internal rate of return (IRR) of clean technology 
projects (Hansen, 2008; Ang, 2009). However, the CDM as a vehicle 
for technological change has been widely criticised in the literature. 
Firstly, it has not reached the scale required to meet the stabilisation 
challenge (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), 2008; McKinsey&Company, 2009). Secondly, its project-
based nature does not foster large scale deployment of mitigation 
technologies or the promotion of innovation in host countries (Staley 
and Freeman, 2009). Thirdly, many of the emission reductions 
achieved by the CDM are not "additional", meaning that they would 
have happened anyway and should not be financially supported 
(Wara, 2009). Several studies of TT in Chinese, Indian, Brazilian and 
Malaysian CDM projects show that income from carbon credits was 
rarely the primary reason why the projects were developed, because 
of the uncertainty of carbon income and the long CDM registration 
time lags (Hansen, 2008; Wang, 2010; Lewis, 2010; Hultman et al. 
2010; He and Morse, 2010). Finally, CDM projects were concentrated 
in the largest emerging economies, while African countries and other 
LDCs have been largely left out (UNEP Riso Centre, 2010). 
The new TM could benefit from a better understanding of the 
drivers and enablers of successful TT to improve UNFCCC perfor-
mance to date. TT are inherently difficult to define and measure, 
which has placed some limitations to the existing econometric 
studies of climate change TT (Dechezleprétre et al., 2008; 
Doranova, 2009; Seres et al., 2009, 2010; Hascic and Johnstone, 
2009; Dechezleprétre et al., 2010; Frankel and Rose, 2002; 
Mielnik and Goldemberg, 2002; Cole and Elliott, 2003; Cole, 
2006; Ang, 2009; Hubler and Keller, 2010). Case studies can show 
the actual TT process and provide a focused, localised, empirical 
and qualitative approach to understanding the variables that 
govern successful TT. 
Case study literature on TT is scarce and has mostly focused on 
the success stories of BRIC economies,2 such as the emergence 
of leading wind turbine manufacturers in India and China 
1
 Data in Seres et al. 2010 about IT in CDM projects rely on IT claims made by 
project participants in the Project Design Documents (PDDs) of 4984 projects that 
were in the CDM pipeline as of 30 June 2010. These claims are subject to 
uncertainty as they are not based on a common definition of TT and they have 
not gone through verification unless they belong to the additionality test. Also, 
they refer to projects often at the design stage, which may not be successfully 
implemented and hence may not deliver emission reductions. 
2
 The term "BRIC countries" was coined by Goldman Sachs to refer to Brazil, 
Russia, India and China as a group of large and fast growing economies. 
(Lewis, 2007; Wang, 2010; Zhang et al., 2009); the world-leading 
Chinese photovoltaic technology (de la Tour et al., 2010); or 
Brazilian biofuels production (Hira and de Oliveira, 2009). How-
ever, these countries do not represent the average developing 
economy. China, India and Brazil offer potential investors the 
prospect of large profits and have an advanced domestic techno-
logical base that allows rapid adoption of foreign technologies. 
Smaller developing countries would struggle to replicate BRIC 
countries' success stories given their smaller bargaining power 
towards foreign technology providers. Further case study research 
is needed to identify the national policies and business strategies 
that have worked or failed in non-BRIC economies. 
This paper contributes to the TT debate with a new case study of 
a Chilean company needing foreign technologies to start up the 
production of wind blades. Selecting Chile is relevant to show the 
challenges faced by companies in non-BRIC countries to attract and 
successfully absorb foreign technologies. The case study provides 
empirical evidence about what constitutes successful TT and what 
are the key factors that enable them. It highlights the particularities 
of low-carbon TT in the context of a relatively small developing 
economy with limited resources. The final aim of the paper is to 
provide policy recommendations that complement those found in 
the existing literature mostly based on empirical evidence from BRIC 
countries. Chile is, nevertheless, a special country due to its 
sustained growth, stable macroeconomic conditions, liberal econ-
omy and OECD membership, which may limit the extrapolation of 
our results to other developing countries. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the 
conceptual and theoretical basis on what constitute TT and its 
enabling environments. Section 3 presents the country context, 
defining the Chilean preconditions for successful TT. Section 4 
introduces the case study of a Chilean start-up for the production 
of wind blades. Section 5 discusses the theoretical framework 
about the concept of TT and its enabling factors in the light of the 
evidence provided by the case study. The conclusion summarises 
the major arguments in the paper and suggests further areas or 
research. 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.2. Conceptualising technology transfer 
The term "technology transfer" has been defined and mea-
sured in many different ways by a wide range of disciplines. Early 
research provided a narrow definition of technology as scientific 
and engineering knowledge and blueprints. The transfer of this 
codified knowledge then constituted TT. This concept has evolved 
and now technology is defined in broader terms, as encompassing 
the corporate capacity to operationalise and effectively use this 
knowledge in production (Cantwell, 2009). Technology in the 
second case is tacit and refers to firm-specific competence in 
production. Its transfer involves an internal learning process in 
the recipient company. 
Several authors have distinguished three different flows of 
transferred technological content, from lower to higher impact on 
the technological capabilities of the recipient. The first flow 
encompasses capital goods and equipment, it increases the 
production capacity of the recipient, but on its own does not 
enable the recipient to efficiently use the imported facilities or to 
generate technological change. The second flow includes skills 
and know-how for operating and maintaining equipment. It 
places the human resources of the importer at the technological 
level required to efficiently operate the imported technology but 
without indigenous efforts, does not enable technological change. 
The third flow encompasses knowledge and expertise for 
generating and managing technological change. It creates new 
technological capacity through the transfer and the active inde-
pendent learning, creation and innovation of the recipient (Bell, 
1997; Wei, 1995; Ockwell et al., 2008). 
In the field of climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) provides a frequently quoted definition of 
climate-change TT as "a broad set of processes covering the flows 
of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and 
adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such 
as governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, non-
governmental organisations, and research or education institu-
tions" (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2000). 
Under this broad definition, TT could provide the recipient 
country the capacity to install, operate, maintain and repair 
imported technologies; produce lower cost versions of imported 
technologies; adapt imported technologies to domestic markets; 
and circumstances, and develop new technologies, whilst respect-
ing relevant intellectual property rights (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2009). 
Given the tacit nature of technology in its broader sense, 
measuring TT is inherently difficult. Some publications in the 
field of climate change have attempted to measure TT using as 
proxies the import of foreign equipment or knowledge in CDM 
projects (Dechezleprétre et al., 2008; Doranova, 2009; Seres et al., 
2009, 2010) or the number of filed foreign patents related to 
climate change technologies (Hascic and Johnstone, 2009; 
Dechezleprétre et al., 2010). However, these studies present a 
narrow perspective of technology as equipment or engineering 
knowledge and cannot be taken as an indication of the level of 
skills and knowledge that have been transferred alongside. Case 
studies can provide a more detailed, qualitative account of the 
technology flows and the extent of knowledge spillovers beyond 
the equipment transferred. 
2.2. Enabling environments for technology transfer 
Discussions between the public and private sector often 
conclude that enabling frameworks are needed to accelerate 
technology diffusion to developing countries (World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), 2010). Evidence 
based literature shows that the main enabling elements for 
successful TT are: 
(1) Adequate institutional and economic frameworks. 
These include stable policies, transparent investment regula-
tion and conducive local conditions (WBCSD, 2010). For 
certain technologies an important element is the establish-
ment of an appropriate intellectual property right protection 
to enhance their transfer (Alliance for Clean Technology 
Innovation (ACTI), 2009). A liberal trade policy allows engage-
ment in international economic activities, mostly imports and 
FDI that can channel climate change technologies. Uncoordi-
nated energy policies, uncertainty of institutional frame-
works, excessive bureaucracy or inappropriate power 
purchase agreements (PPA) are behind some TT failures in 
Ghana and South Africa (Gboney, 2009; Grant, 2009). 
(2) Appropriate absorptive capacity. 
A minimum threshold of human capital and infrastructures is 
required for the efficient operation of transferred technologies 
and the subsequent generation of advanced local technologi-
cal capabilities. This requires a functioning education system, 
targeted capacity building programs and capacity at all levels 
of implementation of the technologies: technical, financial, 
business development and regulation (Gboney, 2009; WBCSD, 
2010). Countries with significant technological capabilities 
would have the ability to absorb the most innovative 
technologies and develop an endogenous technological base. 
On the other side, countries with low capabilities would 
target more mature technologies and would have a stronger 
dependence on foreign equipment. 
(3) Large and stable demand. The private sector, owner of most 
climate change technologies and responsible for most TT, is 
attracted by the prospect of a large and stable demand. The 
success of China, India and Brazil in attracting and deploying 
foreign technologies and growing domestic renewable energy 
industries seems to confirm this point. A large market allows 
technology businesses to build a significant production scale 
and achieve lower production costs as a result of economies of 
scale and technological learning curves (Wei, 1995; Stern, 
2007). It also provides scope to develop a wide portfolio of 
low-carbon technologies. Countries with a small demand 
would instead be expected to have a narrower portfolio, 
focused in the technologies where they have significant 
competitive advantages. 
(4) Supportive policies for low-carbon technologies, which help 
to bridge the gap between low carbon solutions and their 
commercial viability. Technology policy is commonly divided 
into market-pull and technology-push policies. Technology 
push policies are those influencing the supply of new knowl-
edge, increasing the absorptive capacity of the recipient 
country and hence reducing the cost of TT. The most common 
examples of technology push measures are government 
sponsored R&D, tax credits for companies to invest in R&D, 
support for education and training, infrastructure develop-
ment and funding demonstration projects (Nemet, 2009). 
Market pull policies influence the demand of technologies 
expecting cost reductions through a variety of learning 
processes as the installed capacity increases (Grubb, 2004). 
Common examples of market pull policies in the field of 
climate change include: carbon markets, tax credits and 
rebates for low-carbon consumption, energy efficiency stan-
dards, feed-in tariffs, renewable energy portfolios and taxes 
on competing technologies, intellectual property protection, 
government procurement or technology mandates (Nemet, 
2009; de Coninck et al., 2008). Both demand-pull and tech-
nology-push are complementary and a mix of them is 
necessary for technological development (Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1979). Experience in China, India and Brazil has 
shown that in addition to a large demand, successful TT 
responded to governments' strong signals and incentives 
favouring low-carbon growth (Lewis, 2007; Ockwell et al., 
2008; Ribeiro and De Abreu, 2008; Wang, 2010; Zhang et al., 
2009). 
3. Country context: Chilean enabling environments for TT in 
the wind industry 
3.1. Institutional and economic framework 
An enabling environment for investment contributes to the 
Chilean attractiveness for receiving TT. Chile's investment frame-
work is characterised by high economic growth, the sharp drop of 
public debt, the stabilisation of external accounts and the favour-
able conditions for international trade, amongst others. The 
economy has experienced a fast recovery from the global reces-
sion and the damage caused by the earthquake in 2010. Growth 
rates of up to 5% were expected for 2010 and up to 6-7% for 2011 
(Bloomberg, 2010). In addition, free trade agreements allow 
companies in Chile to access 86% of the world's GDP 
(InvestChile, 2011). 
All these factors have contributed to Chile's entry into the 
selective group of OECD members in 2010, making it the first 
South American member and the first country to join the 
organisation in ten years. In recent years incoming FDI has 
maintained an upward trend, helping to improve Chile's competi-
tiveness not only through resource seeking FDI but also through 
technological development and specialised know-how (Chilean 
Foreign Investment Committee (FIC), 2011). Over the past decade, 
FDI has represented an annual average 6.5% of Chile's GDP, rising 
to an average of 8% in the period 2007-2009 (Chilean Foreign 
Investment Committee (FIC), 2009). 
Chile was ranked 11th in the Heritage Foundation and The 
Wall Street Journal's 2009 Index of Economic Freedom. This score 
placed Chile above nearly all of the European economies and only 
one position behind the United Kingdom. In the Global Trade 
Enabling Report issued by the 2008 World Economic Forum, Chile 
was ranked as one of the world's most open economies in terms 
of international trade and investment—27th out of 118 countries 
(World Economic Forum, 2011). In the 2010 World Competitive-
ness Yearbook published by the Institute for Management 
Development (IMD) in May 2010, Chile took 28th place out of 
58 economies. 
3.2. Absorptive capacity 
Education statistics show that Chile is well positioned among 
emerging and developed economies. Chile currently has the highest 
school internet access rate in Latin America and spends 3.2% of its 
GDP on education (InvestChile, 2011). Literacy rates surpass 95% of 
the population and the average years of schooling of local workforce 
is 10.5 years (InvestChile based on Mineduc and UNESCO). Second-
ary education has expanded dramatically and government educa-
tion initiatives emphasising English-language proficiency and digital 
literacy are providing businesses with the necessary skills to operate 
internationally (InvestChile—CORFO). 
However, there is a common acceptance that the quality of 
Chilean education lags far behind that of developed countries. 
According to UNESCO, in 2005 Chile had almost 1.000 full time 
equivalent researchers per million inhabitants (almost the same 
as Argentina) while countries like Australia had more than 4.000 
(Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la Competitividad (CNIC), 
2008). 
There is a rising consensus about the role of innovation as a 
driver for Chilean development. Since the mid-1980s, Chile's econ-
omy has been fuelled by natural resources based export markets 
with significant concentration of production in a few sectors: 
mining, pulp, paper and fruits. The high commodity prices allowed 
a 7.1% average growth rate between 1984 and 1998. However, since 
1998, growth rates have decreased significantly as well as the Total 
Factor Productivity (TPF), which fell from an annual average of 
2.8-0.4% between 1998 and 2005 (Consejo Nacional de Innovación 
para la Competitividad (CNIC), 2010). 
The National Innovation Council for Competitiveness (CNIC) 
was established in 2005 to create a national innovation strategy. 
Its data shows that Chile's low participation in certain electronics 
and transport industries explains why aggregate R&D investment 
rates are almost 50% lower than the OECD average, even if Chilean 
total investment rates are similar to average OECD countries. 
Some positive indicators about innovation show that during the 
1990-2005 period, the number of patents per million of inhabi-
tants grew from 10 to 40 and is expected to achieve more than 
100 in 2010. In the same period, the number of scientific 
publications grew from 1200 to 3500. However, recent recom-
mendations by the OECD suggest a need for a stronger link 
between scientific development and industry needs, as well as a 
diversification of the economy and the transition towards higher 
value added activities (OECD, 2010). 
The implementing institutions of Chile's innovation policy are 
CONICYT (Science and Technology Council) and CORFO (the 
Chilean Economic Development Agency). In general terms, 2/3 
of the funds to support and encourage innovation come from the 
public sector, while 1/3 come from the private sector. CONICYT 
covers individual basic research and has more than twice the 
budget allocated to CORFO for industrial innovation and applied 
R&D. InnovaChile is the implementing agency for CORFO's inno-
vation policies. The agency supports Chilean firms to improve 
their competitiveness in national and international markets by 
promoting the development of innovative processes. Energy 
related small-and-medium size companies in cooperation with 
university research centres are some of the main beneficiaries. 
From 2005 to 2010 InnovaChile supported more than 120 innova-
tion projects on Renewable Energy, allocating more than U$40 
million to transfer, improve or develop technology. InvestChile is 
one of the instruments used by CORFO for attracting FDI to 
Chilean prioritised economic sectors. The instruments used 
include, matching grants for pre-investment, fixed capital, fund-
ing start-ups, capacity building and real estate leases. 
A significant weakness for innovation in energy technologies is 
the lack of a clear Research, Development and Deployment 
(RD&D) strategy at the Ministry of Energy (IEA, 2009). The merit 
of individual projects is the main basis for the approval of basic 
research funding. As a result, activities are dispersed, collabora-
tion between institutions is lacking, and research is project-driven 
rather than linked to the country's needs. Renewable energy is not 
considered a priority sector under the Chilean innovation strat-
egy, rather it is considered as a transversal technology platform 
relevant to all niches of the Chilean economy. Using competitive-
ness as the only measure might be a narrow goal for future energy 
R&D priorities. Other factors such as environmental sustainability 
and energy security should also be taken into account (IEA, 2009). 
The Centre for Renewable Energy (CER) is currently preparing a 
study on skills and competences required for the renewable 
energy industry in the country to create a basis for a clearer 
strategy. 
Within the country's industrial sectors, mining is a significant 
source of Chilean technological capabilities. It represents 19% of 
Chiles' GDP and 60% of its exports in average throughout the last 
5 years (Sociedad Nacional de Minería (SONAMI), 2011; Banco 
Central de Chile, 2010). The budget for the national innovation 
system, mainly the grants provided to innovative entrepreneur-
ship and local R&D, comes directly from royalties and production 
taxes over mining operations. Furthermore, the mining industry is 
the main source of local expenditure on R&D, the fourth sector 
with the highest score on innovation practices, and the main 
patent owner of the Chilean economy (21%). The mining sector 
has a strong foreign presence, but significant technological 
capabilities have developed among local suppliers of goods and 
services. Local suppliers need to operate in a global market and 
have incentives to compete by developing world class technology. 
3.3. Renewable energy technology demand 
Chile has a population of 16.7 million and a GDP of 104.6 
billion 2000 USD (IEA, 2010b). Its economy accounts for only 4% 
of the Chinese economy and around 12% of Indian or Brazilian 
economies. Chile is also significantly smaller than many of its 
Latin American neighbours. Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia 
and Venezuela have larger economies and all of them, including 
Peru, also have larger populations (IEA, 2010a). Accordingly, 
Chile's energy consumption is behind most of these larger 
countries, although higher energy intensity places Chilean 
electricity consumption ahead of Colombia and Peru. Since 1990, 
Chile has experienced fast growth in electricity consumption at an 
annual average of 7% between 1990 and 2008, well above the 3% 
Latin American average (United States Energy Information 
Administration (US EIA), 2011). 
Chile's energy sector is characterised by limited indigenous fossil 
energy resources, unlike many of its South American neighbours. 
Heavy dependence on imported fossil fuels has created serious 
periods of electricity shortages during the first decade of this 
century. On the other hand, Chile's geography provides a high 
potential for renewable energy. Biomass and hydropower are 
significant primary energy sources in the Chilean energy balance. 
Jointly they provided 40% of primary energy consumption in 2008, 
when considering a calorific power for hydroelectricity equivalent to 
that of the Chilean electricity generation matrix (Comisión Nacional 
de la Energía (CNE), 2010a). In the electricity generation matrix, 
hydropower plants can provide up to 50% of the country's electricity 
needs in years with good rainfall (such as in 2006) and have 35% of 
the generation installed capacity (CNE, 2010b). However, the 
penetration of the so-called "Non-Conventional Renewable Energy" 
(NCRE) technologies is still low. NCRE is defined by the Chilean 
Government as electrical energy generated through non-conven-
tional, renewable, primary energy sources, that has a low environ-
mental impact, including biomass, hydropower with less than 
20 MW capacity; geothermal energy; solar energy; wind; and 
marine power. 
In December 2010 installed capacity of NCRE in Chile was 
452 MW, representing 3% of the country's total installed capacity 
(CNE, 2010b). Grid connected wind capacity in December 2010 
was 162.5 MW. It is expected that Chile will reach 202 MW of 
wind power installed capacity by 2020 to meet the country's 
renewable energy portfolio targets. This estimation considers that 
the most competitive NCRE, particularly hydro, would contribute 
to most to the target. The Chilean Congress is leading efforts to 
increase the share of NCRE to 20%. If legal modifications to the 
current regulatory framework prospered, Chile could achieve 
almost 1300 MW of total wind installed capacity by 2020. In 
any case, these figures contrast with the large expected wind 
capacities of other Latin American countries like Brazil, with 
31.6 GW and Mexico, 6.6 GW by 2025 (HIS, 2010). 
The main companies operating wind power projects, making 
investments or planning new wind power projects in Chile are 
linked to the main international power companies, such as 
Endesa, SN Power and GDF Suez. However, there is a recent trend 
for new capacity additions and new projects in the portfolio 
headed by the mining and chemical industries. For example, 
during 2010 the Canadian based company Methanex started 
operating a 2.34 MW wind farm to boost power production at 
its methanol plants, due to the rise in the natural gas price. 
Mining company "el Toqui" has recently started operating a 
1.5 MW wind power plant for its own power consumption. Gold 
mining company Barrick is undergoing the construction of a 
36 MW project and Australia's Pacific Hydro is planning to build 
wind farms for the mining operations of BHP Billiton in northern 
Chile. Furthermore Codelco, the main state-owned mining com-
pany and the world largest copper producer, has started the 
tendering process for the construction of a wind power project. As 
a consumer of almost 15% of energy in Chile (CNE, 2010a), the 
mining industry is particularly interested in taking advantage of 
local resources to achieve security of energy supply and comply 
with renewable energy regulations. 
3.4. Supportive policies for low carbon technologies 
For the past 30 years Chilean energy policy has been founded 
on the premise that the best ways to meet electricity demand at 
affordable prices are to rely on competition between private 
companies, regulate natural monopolies and limit the role of 
the state in business decisions. In 1982 Chile pioneered the 
privatisation of the electricity market. Since then, the average 
cost of technology and technical reliability have been the only 
relevant variables taken into consideration for decisions on 
capacity expansion, above other considerations such as diversify-
ing the generation portfolio, limiting greenhouse gas emissions, 
enhancing local technology development or creating high 
skilled jobs. 
The assumption that competitive markets would deliver 
security of supply was embedded in this private approach to 
the electricity system. However, heavy dependence on imported 
fossil fuels created serious periods of electricity shortages during 
the first decade of this century. The large renewable energy 
potential of Chile has not been fully harnessed to increase security 
of supply because long term planning on capacity expansion to 
incorporate renewable energies is not easily compatible with the 
existing electricity model, which is better suited for short terms 
decisions on dispatch through merit order. 
Over the past five years, conditions for the development of 
NCRE in Chile have improved considerably. This has been done 
through new laws, the creation of instruments for direct support 
to investments (loans and grants for pre-investment studies), 
better information on renewable resources, the implementation 
of investment projects and the recognition of diversification of the 
energy mix as one of the core objectives of the current energy 
policy (Comisión Nacional de la Energía (CNE) and Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2009). The 
associated regulatory framework has been improved over 
the years, maintaining the original goal of minimising global cost. 
The main changes include a new market pull policy to encourage 
NCRE deployment in Chile. Law 20.257 that came into force on 
April 1st, 2008, obliges power companies selling directly to final 
customers to incorporate 5% of NCRE into their electricity sales. 
This percentage will increase gradually to 10% by 2024. Compa-
nies who do not comply with this request have to pay a penalty. 
However, power companies are currently indifferent about choos-
ing to pay the penalty or to comply with the law. This could be 
because when large power companies cannot develop their own 
NCRE projects, they prefer to pay the penalty and pass the cost 
through their customers rather than allowing the entry of new 
competitors in the market (Diario Financiero, 2010). Besides, the 
law applies only to new contracts and therefore a large percen-
tage of the current contracts are not affected. It is hard to assess 
the deadline of all current contracts and therefore difficult to 
estimate the future demand of new NCRE projects. This situation 
creates uncertainty on the real value of the renewable energy 
attribute and makes it difficult to implement the legislation. 
The current government aspires to incorporate at least 20% of 
NCRE in total installed capacity by 2020. However at the date of 
submission of this paper, no roadmap or plan have been made 
public to illustrate how this aspiration would be met. Further-
more, for the local and international investors an aspiration is not 
a strong signal. In the Chilean competitive market it is still very 
hard for a new independent power producer to dispatch to the 
grid, especially considering the high levels of uncertainty behind 
the projected marginal costs of electricity. This commercial risk 
can only be managed by traditional large power companies who 
distribute the risk on a wide portfolio, and therefore concentrate 
most new generation capacity. 
Some institutional developments favouring renewable energy 
are the creation of the Ministry of Energy and the Centre for 
Renewable Energy (CER) in 2009. The CER activities are focused in 
two areas: accelerating investment in NCRE and becoming a 
knowledge and TT hub. The CER is expected to have a lead role 
in promoting renewable energy technologies in the market and to 
serve as a clearinghouse connecting research entities and private 
companies to the international network of renewable energy 
technologies. One relevant effort from the Ministry of Energy is 
the ongoing bidding process of public land for wind power 
projects, in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Goods. As 
part of the bid, the government provides wind potential informa-
tion based on wind measurements and mesoscale models. 
4. Case study: development of an indigenous wind 
component industry in Chile 
4.1. Introduction to the case study 
This paper uses Fibrovent Wind3 (FW), a Chilean company 
starting up the production of wind blades, as an example of TT in 
non-BRIC developing countries. FW was created as a partnership 
between the Spanish wind turbine provider Eozen and the 
Chilean company Fibrovent. The partnership had been initially 
conceived as a joint venture but has subsequently developed into 
a purely commercial relationship where Eozen will sell Fibrovent 
blade moulds and blade design licences. The information used to 
construct the case study was gathered through company docu-
mentation, two structured interviews and written communica-
tion with company representatives.4 
Fibrovent is part of the SAME Group, a Chilean holding cover-
ing a wide range of services for the mining industry. The SAME 
group was founded in 1982 to provide industrial ventilation 
systems in Chile. In 1992, SAME developed its first project for 
the mining industry. Fibrovent was created in 2002 to provide the 
mining industry with composite materials technologies for venti-
lation systems. It is now the leading Chilean supplier of these 
technologies and has gained an international reputation after 
winning projects in South Africa and Laos. In 2009 Fibrovent 
adopted the strategic goal of becoming the first Chilean wind 
blade manufacturer. 
Eozen is a Spanish wind turbine manufacturer founded in 
1999. It is a licensee of Vensys wind turbine technology, which is 
characterised by its simple system concept and high reliability. 
Vensys technology uses direct drive permanent magnet synchro-
nous turbines with no gear box that convert 100% of their 
machine power. Eozen has developed and certified its own blade 
technology specially designed to optimise the output of Vensys 
wind turbines. Eozen finalised in 2007 the construction of its 
production plant in Spain but was soon hit by the contraction of 
the Spanish wind market. It then looked for opportunities abroad 
to sell its wind turbines. In April 2010 Eozen announced a 
redundancy plan for its 90 employees and in January 2011 new 
shareholders entered the company, providing 31.33% of equity to 
avoid the collapse of the company (Alimarket, 2011). 
FW plans to replicate European processes for the manufacture 
of blades for 1.5 and 2.5 MW wind turbines in Chile. FW expected 
3
 Fibrovent Wind is not the real name of the new company. A hypothetical 
name has been created by the researchers because the final name of the wind 
blades producing company had not yet been decided at the date of writing this 
paper.Interviews to Victor Poblete, commercial manager and partner of FW, as 
well as Plant Manager of Fibrovent, José Francisco Antunes, partner and Technical 
Director of FW took place in August 2010 and November 2010. Written commu-
nication by e-mail with both representatives took place on the 2nd of February, 
the 14th and 15th of April, 2011. 
4
 Interviews to Victor Poblete, commercial manager and partner of FW, as well 
as Plant Manager of Fibrovent, José Francisco Antunes, partner and Technical 
Director of FW took place in August 2010 and November 2010. Written commu-
nication by e-mail with both representatives took place on the 2nd of February, 
the 14th and 15th of April, 2011. 
to start operations in 2011, producing 150 blades per year to 
supply a wind capacity of 75-100 MW. A second production plant 
would start operating in 2012, producing 300 blades per year for 
a wind capacity of 150-200 MW. The second plant would 
be expanded in 2013 to produce 600 blades per year for a 
300-400 MW wind capacity. 
4.2. Conceptualising and structuring technology transfer 
Fibrovent's idea to start wind blades production stems from 
business growth aspirations through new applications of composite 
materials. After attending an international congress on renewable 
energies, the company CEO was convinced that business opportu-
nities in the wind market were large and that Fibrovent had the 
capability to start this new venture. However, Fibrovent lacked 
specific technical and market experience in the wind industry. 
Knowledge of wind blade production was not available in Chile 
and therefore foreign technological support was required. 
TT in FW has taken place through several channels, with the 
first two in the list considered as the most significant: 
• Incorporation of a Brazilian expert with more than 20 years 
experience in the manufacture of wind blades and generators. 
• Licences of wind blade designs and blade moulds acquired to 
the Spanish company Eozen. 
• Imports of foreign capital goods. Equipment for wind blades 
manufacture has been sourced from a German company. The 
selection was made on the basis of previous experience from 
the Brazilian expert and the Spanish company Eozen. 
• Participation in several international congresses. Fibrovent's 
staff is continuously involved in international events to keep 
up to date with technological and market developments in the 
wind industry. 
A Brazilian expert joined Fibrovent in May 2009, initially 
through a specialised consultancy assignment and subsequently 
on a permanent basis as a partner of FW. CORFO's InnovaChile 
provided funding for the consultancy appointment through its TT 
support line. The role of this expert has been key for the technical 
and organisational design of the new company, the selection of 
technology providers, the definition of a business plan and the 
capacity building among local staff. The permanent contact of the 
expert with Fibrovent's staff has enabled a profound TT. TT in this 
case has involved not only codified knowledge and blueprints but 
also corporate technological capabilities acquired from the Brazi-
lian wind turbine manufacture experience. Fibrovent has gone 
through a process of internal learning assisted by this foreign 
expert. 
Fibrovent had initially agreed to constitute a joint venture 
agreement with the Spanish company Eozen. The joint venture 
would give the Spanish company 50% of FWs shares and 45% to 
Fibrovent, with the remaining 5% allocated to the Brazilian 
partner. A pre-agreement was made in November 2009 defining 
that FW would commercialise Eozen generators and would use 
Eozen's licensed wind blade design at no cost. The initial target 
market would be Chile, but FW would expect to resume exports 
to the rest of Latin America and beyond after successful deploy-
ment in Chile. The new company would be partly financed with 
public subsidies and partly with a private loan endorsed by the 
SAME group. Negotiations to conclude the joint venture stalled 
due to the financial weakness of Eozen and to the high uncer-
tainty of Chile's demand for wind blades. The TT was subse-
quently conceived as an arm's length relationship between both 
parties where Fibrovent would buy blade design licences and 
moulds from Eozen. Such an arrangement considerably reduces 
the risk for Eozen as well as the potential gains. It also provides 
Fibrovent with more freedom to decide the structure of the new 
company and its potential market. Geographical restrictions for 
the exports of wind blades were among the critical issues under 
discussion in the joint venture agreement but have been elimi-
nated from the current negotiation. 
Fibrovent required a foreign partner to penetrate a market 
with strong entry barriers. An operating plant and a certified wind 
blade design are preconditions for commercial relationships with 
potential customers. Fibrovent's initial decision to structure the 
TT as a joint venture with foreign majority was driven by foreign 
participation requirements to access public financing through 
CORFO's instrument InvestChile. InvestChile is the best available 
support instrument in Chile for starting technological businesses 
requiring TT. It aims to attract highly specialised foreign invest-
ments providing the most generous subsidies, faster and more 
flexibly than any other instrument aimed at local innovation. 
Through InvestChile subsidies, FW was able to finance a large 
share of the initial equipment and human capital costs. 
Eozen was one of the very few foreign technology providers 
that showed some interest in starting a wind blades production 
venture in Chile. All other potential partners were interested in 
penetrating larger markets such as the US, China, India or Brazil. 
In other cases, wind turbine manufacturers were simply not 
interested in sharing their knowledge. The choice of Eozen as 
technology partner was motivated by its openness to collabora-
tion and by technological affinity with Fibrovent's in-house 
expert. After the joint venture negotiations were interrupted 
and replaced by a commercial relationship, more foreign parties 
have become interested. Fibrovent reports that now it does not 
fully depend on Eozen as German and Dutch companies would 
also be willing to sell them wind blade moulds and licences to 
produce in Chile. This has increased Fibrovent's bargaining power 
in the TT negotiation. 
Eozen's initial interest in a joint venture in Chile was motivated 
by the decline of Spanish demand. Participation in FW would allow 
access to the Latin American market, with faster growth rates than 
Spain. Chile was perceived as a low-risk location, with stable 
macroeconomic conditions, low corruption, and a liberal economy 
welcoming foreign investors. Recent Chilean legislation to promote 
renewable energies signalled prospects for wind power demand 
growth. Not having significant international experience, collabora-
tion with a local company would lower Eozen's entry risks to a new 
market. In addition, low-tax rates and free trade agreements eased 
wind blades production for export, at a lower cost than those 
produced in Spain. The subsequent preference for a purely com-
mercial relationship was due to a desire to reduce the risk of the 
transaction, given its own financial weakness and the uncertainty of 
Chilean demand. 
4.3. Enabling environments for technology transfer 
4.3.1. Absorptive capacity 
Fibrovent has gained critical knowledge on composite materi-
als and their properties through its experience as a service 
provider for the copper mining industry. It is a pioneering 
company in the application of state-of-the-art injection technol-
ogies for the composite materials industry in Chile. Significant 
efforts have been made to systematise its processes through the 
implementation of certified quality procedures. This has been 
possible through the professionalisation of its human resources. 
The number of engineers has grown from one to ten since the 
company was born. The quality of Chilean engineering education 
is considered as a key enabler for the creation of endogenous 
technological capability in Fibrovent. However, specific capabil-
ities on wind technology are not available in Chile, which was 
considered as a barrier. 
Experience in the mining industry allows Fibrovent to start the 
new wind blades industry with a well-functioning, trusted, flexible 
and low-cost supply chain. Fibrovent regularly undertakes training 
sessions for their local suppliers to ensure quality of procured goods. 
Moreover, as a distributor of several foreign suppliers, it can ensure 
low cost materials. However, the new wind blades business requires 
expanding their suppliers' network, which they have been doing in 
the last year. Fibrovent executives consider their previous interna-
tional exposure as key to entering the international wind market. 
The company has been exporting composite materials products for 
more than 5 years. It has won significant international bids, which 
have contributed to build credibility and self confidence. Based on 
this experience, the company has learnt that before competing in 
the global market they need to operate successfully in Chile. The 
steep learning curve that Fibrovent has gone through to achieve 
excellence in the mining industry can be now capitalised into the 
new wind blades business, which requires a strong level of precision 
and expertise. 
In addition to cross-sectoral knowledge transfers, Fibrovent is 
actively involved in specific wind technology R&D in its own 
laboratories as well as in partnership with universities. The aims 
of these partnerships are to jointly develop patents; to create 
spin-offs as a result of successful research projects; and to provide 
research and testing services to other institutions. As an example, 
one of the ongoing partnerships with the Chilean Universidad de 
La Frontera is currently working in the design of a wind turbine 
for low wind speed in isolated regions. 
4.3.2. Demand prospects 
FW business plan forecasts blades production for an annual 
wind capacity of up to 400 MW. In December 2010, Chile had only 
162.5 MW of wind capacity and only needs to reach 202 MW by 
2020 to meet the regulated renewable energy targets. A signifi-
cant increase in these targets or an improvement in the imple-
mentation of the legislation would be required to achieve 
commercial feasibility. 
FW relies on the Chilean market to be able to grow and 
compete internationally, for mainly two reasons. Firstly, access 
to international markets depends on credibility gained through 
experience. FW blades need to be operating in a number of wind 
power projects before they can bid for international projects. 
Demonstration projects will be much easier to get in the Chilean 
market. Secondly, Fibrovent needs foreign partners that can 
provide the technological knowledge base. While potential for-
eign partners are not interested in creating an additional compe-
titor in the global market, they are attracted by the possibility of 
penetrating a new market. The existence of a minimum local 
market size, as well as the possibility of entering the Latin 
American market has been a prerequisite for Eozen to enter in 
negotiations with Fibrovent. 
Lack of clear demand prospects delayed and eventually 
stopped the formalisation of a joint-venture between Eozen and 
Fibrovent. Eozen preferred a less-risky commercial agreement 
with its Chilean counterpart. The construction of the production 
plant slowed down until demand for wind generation projects 
builds up to the planned blade production capacity. In the last five 
years the Chilean regulatory framework has taken some steps to 
support renewable energy and has declared an aspirational target 
of 20% renewable power production by 2020. However, flaws in 
the implementation of the existing renewable energy legislation 
and electricity price instability have prevented a significant and 
stable local demand. Fibrovent is actively involved in local 
lobbying groups requesting regulatory amendments that extend 
the demand of renewable energy. 
In any case, the relatively small size of the Chilean market 
presses FW to grow internationally. While Latin America is the 
initial target region, FW expects to supply to other developing and 
emerging economies. Competition is considered too strong in 
Europe due to the vast number of suppliers already operating in 
the area. While the free trade agreement with the United States 
provides good opportunities to access this market, barriers of 
entry are higher than in South-South commercial operations. 
FW's executives have estimated that their blades will be able to 
sell at 40% less than European blades and 20% less than Brazilian 
ones. Sources of competitive advantage come from Chilean low 
taxes and free-trade agreements and Fibrovent's access to cheap 
raw materials. 
4.3.3. Supportive polities 
Technology-push and market-pull policies stimulated Fibro-
vent's initiation of a low carbon TT process. However, flaws in 
these policies have also slowed down the process. 
Technology-push policies have had a direct impact in enabling 
TT. CORFO's InnovaChile financed Fibrovent's appointment of an 
external consultant that later on became a key member of the 
new company. CORFO's InvestChile support line for foreign 
investors provided part of the initial capital investment needs of 
FW. InvestChile requirement that the funded company should 
have a majority foreign participation made Fibrovent decide to 
channel the TT through a joint venture. This prevented Fibrovent 
and Eozen from selecting the most appropriate channel for their 
specific situation. Given the high capabilities of Fibrovent, the 
weak financial situation of Eozen, the lack of any other foreign 
companies interested in constituting a joint venture, and the 
uncertain demand for wind technology in Chile, an arms-length 
relationship presented a number of advantages over a joint 
venture. It increased the bargaining power of Fibrovent and 
reduced the risk for Eozen. The joint venture negotiations were 
eventually stopped and replaced by a purely commercial relation-
ship. This will not have severe implications for FW's access to 
InvestChile's funds, because the instrument is currently being 
modified to allow the participation of national companies inde-
pendently from foreign investors. 
Demand-pull policies have also had a mixed impact on FW's TT 
process. FW's representatives acknowledge that Law 20.257 
setting renewable energy quotas was an important factor in 
attracting foreign technology providers. However, the inability 
of Law 20.257 to spur investment in wind power plants has also 
been quoted as one of the main stumbling blocks in their TT 
negotiations. Chilean renewable energy legislation has not been 
strong enough to ensure the quick-start of FW's project and to 
raise interest among a wider group of potential partners. A more 
effective implementation of the renewable energy quota as well 
as policies providing price stability could boost wind energy 
demand. Price stabilisation rather than subsidies through feed-
in tariffs is more likely to work in Chile, given the high price of 
Chilean electricity and its free market economy. The CER is 
currently studying different potential mechanisms for price 
stabilisation. 
While national renewable energy policies are essential for the 
development of a sustained demand, FW representatives consider 
the CDM as irrelevant to provide demand certainty. International 
mechanisms are seen as part of the political framework that could 
enhance international demand, but are not considered in their 
business plan. 
5. Discussion 
The selected case study confirms the prescriptions set by the 
theoretical framework and provides additional evidence about 
enabling factors and policies that are specific to non-BRIC devel-
oping countries. 
The case study confirms a perspective of TT as going beyond 
the mere acquisition of foreign equipment and knowledge. The 
process of TT in this case study is not limited to the use of a 
certified blade design, the acquisition of foreign licences and 
equipment or the use of the engineering knowledge of a foreign 
specialist. TT is rather the assimilation of foreign knowledge for 
the generation and management of technological change, which 
involves an intense learning process. Our findings ratify that 
success in TT is linked to the assimilation of the technology and 
its contribution to the dynamics of technical change of the 
recipient company. The process of TT experienced by FW could 
bring significant technological change to Chile, introducing a high 
value added manufacturing activity with the potential of signifi-
cant spillovers. At the business level, TT structured as the 
recruitment of a Brazilian specialist has been particularly success-
ful. The day-to-day contact has enabled Fibrovent's process of 
internal learning and subsequent capacity to implement technical 
change. The fact that this constituted a South-South relationship 
seems to have eased the transfer process, with recipient and 
provider acknowledging a high degree of affinity. The relationship 
with the Spanish technology provider appears more narrowly 
restricted to codified knowledge. In this case, intermittent con-
tact, low demand prospects, a risk-averse profile of the provider 
and the North-South character of the transfer may have limited 
further knowledge spillovers. 
Chile, as a medium-sized emerging economy faces particular 
challenges to attract and successfully absorb foreign low-carbon 
technologies. Its electricity consumption accounts for only 2% of 
China's and 9% of Brazil's. Therefore it cannot afford to implement 
a diversified low-carbon electricity generation matrix. It must 
focus instead on a reduced group of technologies to reach 
affordable costs through economies of scale and learning by 
doing. Decisions on the group of technologies that could guide 
Chile's low-carbon development path should take into account 
the country's sources of competitive advantage. Some cross-
sectional sources of competitive advantage come from its open 
economy, low taxes, functioning institutions and low location 
risk. These attributes make Chile competitive by lowering trans-
action costs, exporting costs and labour costs. Technology-specific 
sources of competitive advantage are based in pre-existing 
knowledge, abundant and cheap natural resources and availabil-
ity of skilled human resources. 
The Chilean mining sector has facilitated specialisation in a 
number of advanced technologies, which can be transferred to 
some renewable energy sectors. This pre-existing knowledge 
allows local start-ups to become competitive faster. FW provides 
an example of how technological knowledge about composite 
materials in the mining sector can be transferred to the renewable 
energies sector. Other cases of cross-sectoral TT from the mining 
sector have taken place in the fields of geothermal and solar 
energy. Geothermal exploration requires expensive drilling 
equipment and human resources for an integral assessment of 
reservoirs. The mining industry shares a relevant part of this 
knowledge and capacities. Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) tech-
nology uses molten salts to store thermal energy during the night 
to provide continuous supply of power. Most of the salts used in 
the world's CSP power plants are provided by SOJVI, a Chilean 
company leader in the industry of fertilisers, lithium, iodine 
and explosives for mining companies. In the prioritisation of 
renewable energy technologies, small developing countries 
could follow this example, analysing their knowledge base and 
studying the possibility of cross-sectoral TT. In addition, targeted 
technology-push mechanisms are required to bridge the 
knowledge gap. 
The main stumbling block in TT negotiations has been the 
small and uncertain demand for wind technology in Chile. 
A significant local demand is necessary to attract foreign technology 
leaders. Foreign investors are usually attracted by large markets 
and are willing to share knowledge assets in exchange for the 
large future profits that these markets can offer. Future profits in 
small developing countries may not compensate for the loss of 
competitive advantage involved in giving up some knowledge 
assets. Chilean demand-pull policies have not been strong enough 
to ensure the quick-start of FW's project and to raise interest 
among a wider group of potential partners. Transparent and 
effective demand-pull policies contribute to the feasibility of 
low-carbon projects in small and medium developing countries 
that require TT, even if this projects aim at selling to a global 
market. 
Another option to increase the market potential of small and 
medium developing countries is to bundle customers, services, or 
markets across borders. In South America, Chile, Colombia and 
Peru aspire to form a common market, joined by Mexico. The 
three countries have a growing affinity as fast-growing, medium-
sized countries with Pacific coastlines, betting on market econo-
mies, foreign investment and trade with Asia to achieve develop-
ment (The Economist, 2011). A common market would facilitate 
bundling together products from all three countries to achieve a 
significant scale for exports. It would also create the possibility to 
bundle demand to reach the scale required by foreign investors. 
Access to the Latin American market through a regional base in 
Chile could be an incentive for foreign partners and presents a 
number of advantages. Firstly, being a small country facilitates 
creating alliances because there is no fear of creating strong 
global competition. Strong protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) also provides the right signals for foreign knowl-
edge-intensive industries fearing loss of competitiveness by 
sharing knowledge with low-cost manufacturing companies in 
developing countries. Furthermore, Chile's smaller size gives 
technology providers the flexibility to adapt to the market's 
varying condition and to recover earlier from wrong design or 
marketing decisions before approaching the global market. 
The case study also shows that when local technology reci-
pient companies have significant capabilities, technology-push 
policies should be flexible enough to let them choose the most 
appropriate TT channel. Chile's technology-push policies to sti-
mulate joint-ventures with foreign companies attracted only a 
second tier company without the financial strength required to 
take risks. They reduced the bargaining power of the local 
company, whose project depended on a single interested foreign 
partner. A shift towards a purely commercial relationship has 
increased the bargaining power of the local company and reduced 
the risk for the foreign company. 
As regards the relevance of UNFCCC mechanisms for the TT 
process, evidence shows that they have not played any role in 
FW's business plan. New technology-related international instru-
ments should be closer to actual needs of companies in develop-
ing countries. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has provided some evidence about the country 
factors and business strategies that enable successful TT to a 
small emerging economy. A Chilean company starting up the 
manufacture of wind blades has been used as a case study. 
This analysis shows that TT not only involves equipment and 
codified knowledge, but also the ability to use them to generate 
and manage technological change. This ability requires a certain 
absorptive capacity. In Fibrovent's case, it was gained through 
cross-sectoral TT from the mining sector and an internal R&D 
strategy. Small developing countries should identify such oppor-
tunities for cross-sectoral transfers. Our case study has pinpointed 
the importance of a minimum local demand and the access to 
foreign markets to attract foreign technology providers. Effective 
national market-pull policies depend highly on each country's 
circumstances. Chile's liberal economy and high electricity price 
made it choose renewable energy quotas as the most cost-
effective policy. However, some flaws in implementation of the 
legislation and the uncertainty of future electricity prices have 
prevented growth of renewable energy and deterred TT activities. 
Technology-push policies should be adapted to the capabilities of 
local technology recipient companies and avoid forcing depen-
dence on foreign technology providers. 
The lessons learnt through our case study may not be applic-
able to many developing countries. Chile's OECD membership, 
free trade philosophy, ease of doing business and good macro-
economic indicators make it special. Further research would be 
necessary to describe other non-BRIC developing countries' 
experiences. In any case, the importance of a pre-existing knowl-
edge base; the international dimension of local companies; well-
designed technology-push and market-pull national policies; and 
the possibility to bundle regional markets are general recommen-
dations relevant for all policy makers in the developing world. 
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